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C O N T E N T S

FOR THE DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF DIVINITY

Schleiermacher's Contribution to Christian Theology

Masaichi Goto

A Revaluation of the Spiritual Forces Involved
in the Development of Christian Personality

Eugene Vail Haynes

From the Jewish Sabbath to the Lord's Day and
the Christian Sabbath

Paul I. Hershey

The Word *Amartia* in Paul

Gerald Kennedy



Schleiermacher's Contribution to
Christian Theology

by

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Stubenrauch and sister to Professor Stubenrauch, of the University of Halle. The family was poor, but intelligent and pious. Outwardly a Calvinist, inwardly his father renounced Calvinism. In this respect "he was only one out of a multitude of preachers in Protestant Europe who at that time conformed in their public ministrations to the established doctrine, but in their hearts held a rationalistic view that true religion and essential Christianity¹ consisted in the belief in God, virtue and immortality." Chaplain Schleiermacher later changed this view and became a Moravian Brethren and his whole family "ultimately entered the Moravian Community."

Schleiermacher's mother was a noble-minded woman. She was deeply religious and profoundly moral. Her influence over her three children was very great.

Childhood.

Friedrich was an unusually bright child. He made rapid progress in his studies and showed such a disposition to pry into difficult subjects that his mother became alarmed at what seemed his pride and conceit. Because of the change in the parent's spiritual life, his spiritual development was abnormal. At the same time, he was possessed of a nature wonderfully endowed and capable of high religious attainment.

In the year 1870, Friedrich attended a boarding

1. Ibid., p.8.

school at Pless. While there he came under the influence of Ernesti, the famous exegete and advocate of the grammatico-historical method of scripture interpretation, whose enthusiasm awakened in the boy the desire for scholastic career and a love for the ancient classics. "During those years there came over him a strange skepticism, as he call it. It consisted in a suspicion that the whole of what was contained in ancient history was unreal, because he knew nothing of the genuineness of the events mentioned in the literature of those far-off times and because the accounts themselves seemed disjointed and fanciful."¹

At the death of Ernesti in 1781, he returned home. Without an experienced teacher to guide him in his reading, he chose his own books and subjects, which method he later deplored. At the same time, these were days of spiritual profit, for he talked of religious matters with his father. After much spiritual wandering, he finally decided to join the Moravian society, cost what it might. He entered the school of that order known as Paedagogium in June, 1873. With this step the home life was brought to an end. Since then he never saw his parents, for his devoted mother died in the following December, and his father's path and his own began to run apart.

Student Life

The paedagogium at Niesky was of the nature of a gymnasium or preparatory college for young men who wished

1. Ibid., p. 8.

to enter the Christian Ministry. At that time it enjoyed a wide reputation. The instruction given to students was fairly broad. It aimed at breadth rather than learnedness in a single field. "At the same time, the aim of the institution was mainly heart-culture. Also, the greatest care was taken to impress students with the unquestionable-^{theology}ness of Protestant[^], especially the doctrines of Christ's deity and his substitutionary sacrifice, of human depravity, miraculous grace, and future punishment. No effort was spared to give the students an inward attestation of the truth of these doctrines by the cultivation of religious experience corresponding with the doctrinal teaching. This artificial devotion to mysticism stimulated doubts in the minds of some young men who hesitated to submit themselves to a compulsory divine service."¹

Friedrich yielded himself heartily to the surrounding religious influences. His parents rejoiced. Schleiermacher's stay at the Paedagogium lasted two and a quarter years. In the autumn of 1785 he entered the theological seminary at Barby. The conditions here were very much alike the Paedagogium.

A Period of Skepticism

When he first went to Barby he gave himself mostly to exegetical studies and followed the Herrenhurt methods. He held tenaciously to the Moravian faith and hoped to become

1. Ibid., pp. 11 ff.

one of the society's accepted laborers. But this was not to be far as he began to study philosophy, the enquiring spirit of his earlier days reawakened within him. "A change came over him. The rational understanding began to take precedence of the religious feelings. Suspicion developed into doubt, and doubt into skepticism."¹ By the end of his second semester, he had definitely rejected the orthodox system. In several letters to his father, he made known his inner change. His father counselled him to adhere to his old faith, but Schleiermacher could not see his way. The relations between the father and son became strained. The young student could no longer remain at Barby and his request to go to Halle was reluctantly granted by his father. The officials at Barby were glad to get rid of the young heretic. Despite this change in faith, Cross says that "it can scarcely be disputed that the influence of Moravianism on the mind of Schleiermacher was permanently beneficial. To that, more than to any other single element in his character, he owes the peculiar place he has won in the world."²

Studies at Halle

Schleiermacher went to the University of Halle in the spring of 1787 and remained there two years. He then accompanied his uncle to Drossen, where the latter had accepted a pastorate and remained with him a year. "These three

1. Ibid., pp. 17 ff.

2. Ibid., p. 23.

years represent an important period in our young theologian's spiritual development, for at this time, he began to get his theological bearings."¹ His uncle observed with interest the change that had been taking place in his nephew's mind, but now they were able to exchange ideas freely.

At Halle, Schleiermacher entered upon a course of reading, continued for many years, which included in its scope almost all that was of high value in ancient philosophy and theology and the most famous writers of the age of the Reformation. Not only that, but he pursued with intense zeal the history of human opinion which is surely essential to a thorough grasp of theology.

Experience As Teacher and Preacher

In the spring of 1790, Schleiermacher applied for a license to preach. He duly passed the examination and was ordained. From then on until 1796, Schleiermacher lived a varied life full of interest. His father died in October, 1794.

"The next eight years of Schleiermacher's life, from 1796 to 1804, represent the period during which he emerged from semi-obscurity to a recognized place among the scholars of his native country and began to exercise an influence in her affairs."² The many friendships he formed during this period will be considered when we survey the history of his time. It was in 1799, that he published anonymously

1. Ibid., p. 24.

2. Ibid., p. 29.

the work that first brought him fame: "Discourses on Religion to the Educated Among Its Despisers." He also translated Plato's Dialogues which remain one of his great literary monuments. There are numerous other epoch-making works of his, but I must pass them on.

In 1804, Schleiermacher was appointed professor extraordinary at Halle and preacher at the university, with the promise of a future appointment at Berlin, should a new university be founded there. However, his position was so dissatisfying that he almost left it. In the meantime, Napoleon attacked Prussia and the latter was completely defeated. The French attacked Halle. Schleiermacher's house was taken and he was reduced to destitution.

Finally, he severed his connections with the university because it came under the authority of Jerome Bonaparte. He went to Berlin in 1807.

When the much-talked-of university was finally established, Schleiermacher became the head of the faculty of Theology. However, his activities in Berlin were by no means confined to the duties of his professorial position. He was incessant in multiform labors for the public good. Preaching, lecturing, writing, philanthropic work, participation in ecclesiastical and political affairs, efforts in the reorganization of state educational institutions, and the instruction of youths went on together. His part during the disastrous Napoleonic War was very great and he was regarded by the French as a dangerous foe.

Religious Reaction in Prussia

At the conclusion of the war which resulted in Napoleon's defeat, notwithstanding his invaluable services to the cause of the country, Schleiermacher found himself in a difficult position. The overthrow of Napoleon was followed by a vigorous conservative reaction. Frederick William of Prussia wanted to prevent the rise of freedom for the individual and of democracy in government. Therefore, Schleiermacher was by no means 'persona grata' to him, for he could see that individualism in religion spells democracy in ecclesiastical and state affairs. The emperor proceeded to trample under foot the spirit of religious liberty and the rights of the Reformed Church by establishing a strict Lutheranism. Schleiermacher spoke out manfully in opposition. He wrote numerous treatises in defence of his position. Among them was his immortal work entitled: "A Systematic Exposition of the Christian Faith according to the Principles of the Evangelical Church." It was published in 1821 and 1822. In spite of the vigorous pen he wielded, his health was failing. Therefore, he was unable to do the work which he desired.

II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In order to appreciate Schleiermacher and his work, it is extremely necessary that we possess a true understanding of the nature of the Reformation and the modifications through which it passed in the three centuries down to his own time. But a movement so complicated in its ramifications and so far-reaching in its effects cannot be adequately described in a brief sketch such as this permits. Only its chief features, therefore, will be outlined.

Conservative Protestantism

Protestantism, like all other impressive movements in history, spring out of the concurrent operation of many forms of human activity. Political, social, economic, moral, and religious influences combined to produce it. The secret of the great revolution it wrought, however, is to be found in a revival of the religious spirit. Protestantism "was a spiritual revolution, and like all revolutions it swept on by its own inherent force and wrought such results as astonished and ever alarmed, the very men who were at its head. Luther, Melanchthon, Zwingli, Crammer, Calvin, and Knox helped to make the Reformation, but even more they were made by it. Then, too, the Reformation as a religious movement was not produced by theologians and statesmen, but by idealist prophets who awakened the spiritual aptitudes of the people and stirred their will to action." ¹ Such men were

1. Ibid., p. 68.

full of zeal, but they lacked the worldly wisdom that knows how to use human preferences and even selfishness in the interest of a higher end. In their very spirituality lay the chief danger to the cause they served. How true this is today when one looks at the idealist reformers and preachers everywhere!

Naturally, the church of Rome was suspicious of the new movement as officialism everywhere always is of things new. Consequently, the reformers had to look for aid from the governing class outside the Church. The result was of course a compromise of religious principles as the statesmen were willing to tolerate only a modified Roman Catholicism in so far as the change strengthens their position.

A glance at the creeds and confessions of faith put forth by the churches of the Reformation is sufficient to convince anyone of the importance attached to doctrinal statements and their conservatism. Protestants placed great importance on correct doctrines for they considered truth of supreme value. They held a profound conviction that salvation is dependent on belief in true doctrine. Such an attitude toward doctrine often made them narrow and intolerant as is the case even today. That the early reformers were conservative can be readily seen by the meager additions made to the Catholic doctrines. Very often the substance and sometimes the very statements of the ancient Catholic creeds, as set forth in the so-called Apostles Creed, the Nicene Symbol, and the Chalcedonian Formula are reaffirmed with vigor and their force revived.

Still more important than the adoption of these Catholic doctrines was the carrying over of the Catholic habit of mind into Protestant theology. In the exegesis of scripture, however, they were greatly superior to their Catholic opponents; and in the deliverance of multitudes from moral thralldom by their impressive preaching of the atonement of Christ, and the free justification of believers they were the ministers of a service of unspeakable worth to mankind. Their devotion to their cause was of the highest heroic type. Yet the consciousness of the debt we owe to them must not blind us to the fact that much of their theological thinking was unmistakably of the Catholic type.

The Protestants not only hated the Catholics but they also dreaded the Anabaptists. The most radical Anabaptists completely rejected the Catholic doctrines, particularly infant Baptism while the Protestants retained it. This is the main reason for the hatred and fear. No doubt, the Anabaptists were far ahead of their time in their theological thinking. They demanded a complete renunciation of Catholicism and a reinstitution of the churches of the Primitive Christian times. They held to the prerogative of individual relation to God; the apprehension and ministration of the Christian Gospel by the common man; personal obedience as the essence of Christian faith; the Christian churches as free associations on the basis of a common spiritual experience; and the spiritual equality and freedom of all believers.

Protestant reformers suppressed the Anabaptists because they wrongly believed that the latter were going too far.

It is not difficult to comprehend the extreme conservatism of early Protestantism. Theirs was a compromise doctrine with the Catholics. This narrow, intolerant Protestant attitude became the cause of bitter theological controversies that were mostly barren of good. To a brief survey of the conditions thus created, we shall next turn our attention.

The Intellectual Revolt in England and in Europe

England

As we direct our mental searchlight to observe the fruits of Protestantism, it is always important to bear in our minds, that the new movement was "an affirmation of the right of the human mind to freedom of thought."¹ It attacked the usurped authority of the Roman Church. It placed a great deal of emphasis upon the imperishable worth of the individual human spirit and insisted on the absolute freedom of action.

In England, this new spirit manifested itself in such works as Bacon's "Novum Organum" and John Locke's "Essay concerning the Human Understanding." The significant thing about both was the method. Bacon discarded the syllogistic method and adopted the method of induction by observation and experience. The new method was applied to the study of Nature. It gave us natural philosophy and natural theology. Of course, it fell short of our present standard of scientific

1. Ibid., p. 77.

research.

The purpose of Locke's philosophical inquiry was to test the validity of our ideas by an examination of the manner in which we come into possession of them. Both Bacon and Locke, however, sought to limit the application of their methods in the case of Christianity holding that faith and reason should always be separated. They recognized Christianity as a supernatural religion which required a different set of forces (faith) for its understanding.

Following Bacon and Locke, there was a long drawn out controversy between deists and Christian apologists which is of great interest and importance, but for our present purpose a detailed study of it here is unnecessary. It is enough to point out that though many able thinkers were with the apologists, they failed to command the confidence of the people because the spirit of the times had run on in advance of the accepted canons of theological thought which was the basis of the defenders. The apologists made the mistake "by trying to bind the growing thoughts of men to the formulae that satisfied the spiritual demands of an earlier age, but obscured the very truths they were intended to preserve when used as an established rule of faith."¹ How true this is among many of our religious thinkers even today, and it could rightly be stated as one of the greatest reasons why we are losing so many fine people from our churches today. The apologists, instead of making reason supreme,

1. Ibid., p. 85.

tried to defend their great doctrines by means of external evidences, for example, miracles and revelation. The great need of time, as it is today, was a renewed Christianity, a new experience of religion that should produce a new view of its nature. What they needed was not ^anew apology for antiquated doctrines, but new doctrines to make religion vital. The important contribution which this controversy made was that it paved the way for modern textual criticism and the historical method now generally adopted.

In passing it might be noted that the chaotic state of religions in Great Britain is reflected in the writings of the famous philosopher David Hume.¹ This skeptic philosopher, David Hume, not only argued that there was no proof of the existence or the attributes of God declaring that all we have is a mere belief, but proceeded to demolish the prevailing views of the origin and history of religion. Reason is not the basis of religion but human emotions of hope, fear, and the like are its basis. Religion he claimed was founded on faith, not on reason.

Hume's position "was a bold challenge to Protestant thinkers to furnish a theoretical basis of confidence in morality and religion. Kant took up the task of answering the former part of the challenge and Schleiermacher the latter."²

1. For Hume's view of God, Miracles and Religion see Hume's "Philosophical Works" Vol. I, pp. 15-33; 91-94; 125-140; Vol. IV, pp. 124-150; 419-496.

2. Cross: p. 88.

Europe.

The same critical attitude toward traditional beliefs existed in Europe---France, Germany, Holland, in particular ---as in England. An examination of contemporary thought in these countries reveals this. As in England, "Protestantism had accorded to reason an unimpeachable right in things natural, while^{it} also revealed^{that} religion was distinguished from natural religion."¹ Here, we find eminent thinkers like Hugo Grotius who "opposed the doctrine of penal atonement;" Professor Coccejus of Leyden who "rejected the doctrine of decrees and advocated such an exegesis of the New Testament as would bring out its peculiar spirit;" George Calixtus who "sought to relate Christianity favorably to current culture and to emphasize the great central verities rather than the strict terms of the creeds." But greater in influence were the philosophical speculations of the philosophers René Descartes and Baruch Spinoza who tried to satisfy the Protestant quest for certainty by an appeal to the individual self-consciousness. This attempt to explain all existence by the necessary forms of thought inaugurated the philosophical movement which is known as "Illuminism."

Berlin, according to Professor Oman, was the chosen home of the "Illumination". Not only scholars, but all the leading preachers were of the highly respectable cautious type of Rationalist. Immanuel Kant defines it as "man's

1. Ibid., p. 89.

emergence from self-caused pupilage."

In England, the new movement culminated in the Free Thinkers, and in the form of Deism was in direct antagonism to the prevailing Christian faith. In France, the same movement under Voltaire was not only more hostile to Christianity, but less earnest. Rousseau carried the same teaching into social and political questions. Its essential feature was to apply reason to every thing from the standpoint of the individual. The consequence was individualism in politics, sensationalism in philosophy, and utilitarianism in morals. Among the leaders who tried to develop religious truths by a process of rational demonstration on the continent were Christian Wolff, Reimarus, Wettstein, Ernesti, Michaelis, Griesbach, Eichhorn, Semler, and Lessing.

In Germany, however, the interesting thing to note is that the rationalistic movement never assumed the same spirit of opposition to the church, and as a political development was hardly possible. It took an almost exclusively theological aspect. Its creed consisted of a personal God full of wisdom and goodness, immortality, and the necessity of religious ideas for moral motives.

Without doubt the new movement was to the great profit of both man and the Church. But says Professor Oman, "this good was more than counter-balanced by its easy-going optimism, its shallowness, its frivolity and self-satisfaction. Understanding was the final test, and argument the only proof. Religion was reduced to a few common-places; God was a scientific abstraction; Aspiration succumbed to utter paltriness,

and the deeper needs of man were fast becoming incomprehensible."¹

We cannot leave this study without a few words on the bearing of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant on the questions at issue. "From one point of view, Kant is the coping-stone of this movement, from another, he is the foundation of the new time."² "Kant's, 'Critique of the Pure Reason' marks the end of the old German rationalism and introduces a new era in philosophy."³ The aim of Kant was to lay a foundation for morality and also for religion. Though in his book "Religion within the Limits of mere Reason" he made religion simply a handmaid of morality, his critique was concerned not directly with the various systems of philosophy and theology that reason had striven to establish, but with the rational faculty itself. He makes the moral Reason self-legislative in matters of conduct. There is an unexceptional law, a "categorical imperative" and all-embracing ought, without which human conduct would be unmeaning. The authority of this law lies in the very nature of the Practical Reason itself. Given responsibility, and freedom is also therewith given. God is also given because without God the law could not be sure of vindication.

Thus, we see that the outcome of this rationalistic movement was intellectual, moral and religious confusion.

1. Oman, "Speeches" (Eng. Tr.) p. 22 (Introd.)

2. Ibid., p. 22 (Introd.)

3. Cross: p. 93.

These various controversies as well as confusions left religion without much of an anchor. The way to a new apprehension of the whole matter was finally prepared by the great evangelical revival of the eighteenth century.

The Revivals

The dark cloud of unbelief that hung over Protestant lands was dispelled by the gracious out-pourings of a new spiritual faith in England and in Europe. There were the Wesleys and Whitefield in England; Arndt and later Spener in Germany. These men urged laymen and clergymen alike to cultivate a devout spirit, holy living, the practice of family prayer, and the study of scriptures with a view of edification rather than for doctrinal purposes. Freedom of question and answer was allowed. But the success of Pietism in Germany soon begot spiritual self-contentment and finally arrogant intolerance. When German Pietism, thus, began to fail Moravianism "characterized by spontaneity and initiative, Puritanic moral conviction, deep emotional experience, missionary zeal, and a capacity for organization"¹ came to take its place. Hymn-singing, extempore prayer, and fervent utterance were marked features of their meetings. It was in this Moravian atmosphere that Schleiermacher was reared and nurtured. He was the "spiritual child of Moravianism." But as he grew, he became well acquainted with

1. Ibid., p. 101.

the best ancient and modern works of philosophy from Plato to Kant.

While Schleiermacher was drinking deeply from the fountain of Rationalism, there was another school of thought already thriving in Europe---Romanticism. But the great literary movement that began with Lessing and which was now culminating in Goethe was little known to him and not deeply interesting at first. Berlin was already the seat of the conflict between the old classical and the new Romantic schools.

Schleiermacher could not remain disinterested toward the new movement very long and he was introduced to the Romantics, among whom were Henrietta Herz and Friedrich Schlegel,---the leading spirits of the new school. Both of them became Schleiermacher's most intimate friends. It was Schlegel who instigated Schleiermacher to write the "Speeches."

The true intellectual leader of the Romantic School was Goethe. He preferred insight to argument, and an individual thing to an abstraction. Nature he regarded as a beautiful, progressive whole without upheaval or interruption. Life to Goethe is nature's most beautiful discovery and death is a her device for having more life. Her greatest production is man.

Just as in the case of the Rationalistic school, Schleiermacher, through constant intercourse, friendship, and study, was soon powerfully under the influence of the New School. It is here that he found the seed which later

became the gigantic tree of his theology. It is through this precious contact that he began to realize the importance of the individual and gave a great deal of space to intuition in his theology. The idea also that everything is a revelation of the universe and that the universe, itself, is one glorious eternally active whole has its origin in Romanticism. To the Romanticists, we might further note, the cultivation of the individual was the high end of life. They also held that the great end in life was artistic appreciation. To them imagination rather than understanding was everything.

It was while he was amidst these influences that he wrote his "Addresses" in 1799.

III. THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

The discourses in which Schleiermacher has expressed his view of religion are in no sense systematic treatises. The views here presented were taken primarily from Schleiermacher's "Speeches To Its Cultured¹ Despisers." Throughout the "Speeches" a single note is struck,---that is, religion as the immediate contact of the soul with God. It is a feeling of absolute dependence. What you call religion he cries to his hearers is not really such. The dogmas and rites with which many people identify religion are only garments in which for the time it has chanced to clothe itself, but which may be thrown aside without affecting its nature. For he states, "You are doubtless acquainted with the histories of human follies, and have reviewed the various structures of religious doctrine from the senseless fables of wanton peoples to the most refined Deism, from the rude superstition of human sacrifice to the ill-put together fragments of metaphysics and ethics, now called purified Christianity, and you have found them all without rhyme or reason. I am far from wishing to contradict you. What are all these systems considered in themselves, but the handiwork of the calculating understanding, wherein only by mutual limitation each part holds its place? What else can they be, these systems of theology, these theories of the origin and the end of the world, these analyses of the nature of an incomprehensible Being, wherein everything

1. Quotations are from Oman's English Translation.

runs to cold argufying, and the highest can be treated in the tone of a common controversy? And this is certainly-- let me appeal to your own feeling--not the character of religion."¹ At another place Schleiermacher repeats the above idea in these words: "Religion is for you at one time a way of thinking, a faith, a peculiar way of contemplating the world; at another, it is a way of acting, a peculiar desire and love, a special kind of conduct and character."² Both sides belong to religion, but the trouble with many is that they give heed to only one at a time. But it is necessary that we take into consideration both sides of religion. Religion is neither doctrine nor ceremony.

Schleiermacher argues that religion in its own original, characteristic form "is not accustomed to appear openly, but is only seen in secret by those who love it.. Nothing that is essentially characteristic and peculiar can be quite the same as that which openly exhibits and represents it."³ In short, religion never appears quite pure. "Its outward form is ever determined by something else."⁴ Therefore, in order to understand the true nature of religion, we must divorce it from all that belongs either to science or morality. It has its home below thought, even below conscience, in the emotional nature of man. The

1. Oman: pp. 14-15.

2. Ibid., p. 27.

3. Ibid., p. 27.

4. Ibid., p. 33.

nature of religion can be shown quite apart from knowledge whether it be science or morality, for quantity of knowledge is not quantity of piety. Piety can display itself, both with individuality and originality in those to whom this kind of knowledge is not original, though the pious man must in a sense be a wise man. Religion is essentially contemplative. You would never call anyone pious who went about in impervious stupidity whose sense is not open for the life of the world. This contemplation of the pious is "the immediate consciousness of the universal existence of all finite things, in and through the Infinite, and all temporal things in and through the Eternal."¹ Religion, in short, is the sense of the infinite in the finite. It is the feeling of absolute dependence. "Religion is to seek this and find it in all that lives and moves, in all growth and change, in all doing and suffering. It is to have life and to know life in immediate feeling, only as such an existence in the Infinite and Eternal. Where this is found, religion is satisfied; where it hides itself² there is for her unrest and anguish, extremity and death." "Wherefore," to repeat, "it is a life in the infinite nature of the whole, in the One and in the all, in God, having and possessing all things in God, and God in all."³

Because Schleiermacher's great stress upon feeling

1. Ibid., p. 36.

2. Ibid., p. 36.

3. Ibid., p. 36.

seems to exclude religion from all contact with practical life, there are some who have felt that he has no use for knowledge and science, thought and action. However, this is not the case. For though he separates religion from knowledge and science, he holds that "without being know-¹ledge, it recognizes knowledge and science." And as Professor Brown points out "the separation of feeling from thought and action is possible only logically. Practically, they are inseparable connected."² "To wish to have the true science or true practice without religion," Schleiermacher exclaims, "or to imagine it possessed, is obstinate, arrogant delusion and culpable error.... What is all science, if not the existence of things in you, in your reason? What is all art and culture if not your existence in the things to which you give measure, form and order? And how can both come to life in you except in so far as there lives immediately in you the eternal unity of Reason and Nature, the uni-³versal existence of all finite things in the Infinite." It is further pointed out that "every truly learned man"⁴ is "devout and pious." Science without religion is sickly.

Moreover, it must be constantly borne in our minds that the religious feeling of which Schleiermacher makes so much is not the mystic sense of absorption in the Infinite.

1. Ibid., p. 36.

2. Brown: Essence of Christianity, p. 163.

3. Oman: p. 39.

4. Ibid., p. 39.

On the contrary, as Professor Brown indicates "it takes for granted the separate existence of the individual, and realizes itself through the contact of the self with the infinite variety of the world."¹ This idea may be noticed at the place where Schleiermacher speaks of the ideal religious as the man who unites in himself in supreme degree the two inherent tendencies of human nature, the self-assertive and the dependent.² The Infinite of which we are conscious is not a vague unconditioned, but the infinity of existence in general, as it realizes itself through the concrete world of experience with its endless richness and variety. "We cannot be conscious" of the Infinite "immediately and through itself. It can only be through a finite object, by means of which our tendency to postulate and seek a world, leads us from detail and part to the All and the Whole. Hence ^{the} [^] sense for the Infinite and the immediate life of the finite in us as it is in the Infinite, are one and the same."³ Thus, it is the discovery of the Infinite in the very midst of the finite, as that on which it depends, and in which it exists, which makes out the essence of religious life.

"This strong sense of individuality" according to Professor Brown, "gives to Schleiermacher's thought its wonderful freshness and attractiveness."⁴ The religious

1. Brown: p. 163.

2. Cf. Oman: pp. 5-8.

3. Ibid., p. 103.

4. Brown: p. 163.

experience while at the bottom fundamentally the same realizes itself in many ways, according to the different conditions in which the individual may be placed, and the different ways in which he conceive his relation to the Infinite. Schleiermacher repels the notion of one true religion for he states that "religion Fashions itself with endless variety, down even to the single personality."¹ And elsewhere it is also stated that "no one will have his own true and right religion, if it is the same for all."² He insists that religion is various and is "not to be comprehended under one form, but only under the sum total of all forms."³ "All that is religious is good, for it is only religious as it expresses a common higher life."⁴ Religion therefore is not exclusive but it is "the natural and sworn foe of all narrow-mindedness and of all one-sidedness."⁵

According to Schleiermacher, religions differ in kind in as well as their stage of development. The lowest stage of religious development is occupied by idolatry or fetichism. The next stage is polytheism and the third is monotheism. Monotheism is based on the unity of the Supreme and arises out of a self, conscious that the whole world is a unity

1. Oman: p. 50.

2. Ibid., p. 217.

3. Ibid., p. 54.

4. Ibid., P. 54; p. 108, note 8.

5. Ibid., p. 56.

and that we are a part. This is the highest stage of development and is represented by the Jewish, the Christian and the Mohammedan religions.

IV. THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY

Schleiermacher discusses this subject both in the "Speeches"¹ and the "Christian Faith."² Christianity is a monotheistic faith, belonging to the teleological type of religion, and is essentially distinguished from other such faiths by the fact that in it everything is related to the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth."³ Christianity is teleological because it subordinates the sensuous to the ethical. Mohammedanism and Judaism, in part, are aesthetic because they subordinate the ethical to the sensuous. Again, to understand the true spirit of any religion we should not fail to consider its origin. What is the common element that runs throughout the religion? An attempt to ascertain it will turn our attention to the study of its historical founder because it is He that gives the particular religion its individuality. Applying such a test, Christianity becomes not only a teleological monotheism, but also a religion of redemption. Redemption is the key to the religion of Jesus. It implies two things: (1) passively a transition out of a bad state into a better; (2) actively, deliverance supplied by another, Jesus Christ! Further, the usage of the word, redemption, does not essentially imply that the worse condition must have been preceded

1. Oman, "Speeches", pp. 50-56 and also note 8.

2. Christian Faith, pp. 52 ff.

3. Ibid., p. 52.

4. Christian Faith, p. 54.

a better condition. Restoration from the bad to the better is not involved, herein. Redemption means that a person in whom the sensuous consciousness dominated the God-consciousness is changed so that the relation is reversed. In a bad state, a person's God-consciousness has been under the bondage of the sensuous and does not imply the want of the former.

All religions, recognize such a condition. "The aim," therefore, "of all penances and purification is to put an end to the consciousness of this condition or to the condition itself."¹ Christianity is different from other religions, however, because it regards all its religious impulses as dependent upon the redemption effected by Jesus Christ. Furthermore this redemption is posited as a thing which has been universally and completely accomplished by Him. These two points must not be separated from each other. Though in other religions redemption is derivative and dependent on doctrines or forms, in Christianity redemption is the central point and rests on the person of its Founder. And Jesus is Founder of a religious communion simply in the sense that its members become conscious of redemption through Him. Only in Christianity is this the case. Christ, Himself, needs no redemption and is therefore separated from the beginning from all other men and endowed with redeeming power from His birth.² Christianity can never progress beyond Christ.

1. Christian Faith: p. 54.

2. Ibid., p. 62.

How did the Redeemer appear in this world? "The appearance of the Redeemer in history is, as divine revelation, neither absolutely supernatural nor absolutely supra-rational."¹ Christ cannot be considered or explained by "the condition of the circle" in which He appeared, for if it could, He would be "the product of a spiritual process."² However, though His existence transcends nature, we could say that He was influenced by it. Christ's appearance "is the result of the power of development which resides in our human nature.....power which expresses itself in particular men at particular points according to laws which, if hidden from us, are nevertheless of divine arrangement, in order through these men to help the others forward."³ The incarnation in this sense is natural. Since Christ was a man, "there must reside in human nature the possibility of taking up the divine into itself, just as did happen in Christ." Therefore, we cannot say that the divine revelation in Christ was super-natural.

The appearance of Christ, also, was not something absolutely super-rational, because the redemption He accomplishes can be explained by means of the reason which dwells equally in all other men. Yet the supra-rational certainly has a place in the Redeemer and the redeemed. Hence, the super-rational and the rational cannot be

1. Christian Faith: p. 62.

2. Ibid., p. 63.

3. Ibid., p. 63.

totally separated in the work of redemption. Bearing all that have here said, Schleiermacher holds that "there is no other way of obtaining participation in the Christian communion than through faith in Jesus as the Redeemer.

V. THE DOCTRINE OF GOD

The discussion of the doctrine of God cannot be fully understood without first knowing Schleiermacher's idea of the Christian religious-consciousness. The Christian religious consciousness presupposes and involves the consciousness of absolute dependence of God. It is asserted that "in every religious affection, however much its special contents may predominate, the God-consciousness must be present and cannot be neutralized by anything else, so that there can be no relation to Christ which does not contain also a relation to God."¹ There can be no religious experience, within the Christian communion, which does not involve a relation to Christ.

It is possible to give a non-religious explanation of this sense of absolute dependence by stating that absolute dependence of all finite things on the whole (world) not on God. This is a misconception for our awareness of the world differs from the awareness of God. We are one of the finite things that go to make a unity, of which the world is the sum total. "To be one with the world in self-consciousness is nothing else than being conscious that we are a living part of this whole."² "This cannot possibly be a consciousness of absolute dependence."³ "This feeling

1. Christian Faith: p. 131.

2. Ibid., p. 132.

3. Ibid., p. 132.

4. Ibid., P. 132.

of absolute dependence, in which our self-consciousness in general represents the finitude of our being is therefore not an accidental element or a thing which varies from person to person, but is a universal element of life, and the recognition of this fact entirely takes the place¹ —of all the so-called proofs of the existence of God."

The suggestion that the Christian churches should develop this God-consciousness in youth is a timely one for us today.

The Attributes of God

Schleiermacher ascribes four attributes to God.

First, God is eternal. "The eternity of God is absolutely timeless causality of God, which conditions not only all that is temporal but time itself as well."² The eternity of God is inseparably related to His omnipotence. In spite of this relationship it does not follow that the temporal existence of the world must also reach back into infinity, so that no beginning of the world can be thought of.³ For the world which arises in time is grounded in the omnipotence of God. It has been "willed and enacted by Him in an eternal manner."⁴ This idea of eternity carries with it the idea of changelessness. There is no reason to make unchangeability a separate attribute. God is unity—not a

1. Ibid., pp. 133-134.

2. Ibid., p. 205.

3. Ibid., p. 206.

4. Ibid., p. 206.

unity made up of manifold parts. God is perfection itself and is not capable of further growth. There is neither age nor youth in Him.

Secondly, God is Omnipresent. Omnipresence is defined as "the absolutely spaceless causality of God, which conditions not only all that is spatial, but space itself as well."¹ This means that to God there is no here nor there, no above nor below. Thus everything belonging to the former proposition is carried over, changing time into space. The idea of omnipresence pervades the religious life to a greater degree than the idea of eternity, probably due to the fact that the majority of religious people are bound up in their consciousness with the present. However, it cannot be said that there is a difference in the degree of his presence in different places. The only difference is in the receptivity of various existences.² Finally, this idea need not carry with it the idea of immensity. The latter is objectionable because it cannot be used without importing something of spatiality into the being of God.

Thirdly, God is omnipotent. Two ideas are implied: (1) that the entire system of Nature, including space and time, is founded upon divine causality; (2) that the divine causality, as affirmed in our feeling of absolute dependence, is completely expressed in the totality of being and that everything for which there is a causality in God happens

1. Ibid., p. 106.

2. Cross: p. 167.

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and becomes real.

What has not happened cannot have happened. Furthermore there is no distinction between God's will and God's power. Omnipotence does not mean, however, that he can do anything, but anything He pleases. His power is subject to certain self-limitations because of His moral nature and the freedom granted to His creatures.

Finally, God is omniscient—that is, all-knowing. This is to be understood as the absolute spirituality of the divine Omnipotence.² God knows every individual in relation to the whole of which he is a part, and the whole in relation to every individual which it contains. However, we cannot ascribe human activities to Him. We cannot use of Him such terms as memory, experience, contemplation, foreknowledge for these involve a sensuous element and therefore put God within antithesis.

To these main attributes which belong to God as absolute, such attributes as unity, infinity and simplicity are added, but they can be admitted only if they possess dogmatic content.³ Thus, it is upon all these attributes that Schleiermacher constructs his conception of God. However, in themselves, they are neither complete nor sufficient. They must be supplemented by others which are necessary for the complete explication of the idea. To these attributes

1. Christian Faith: pp. 211 ff.

2. Ibid., p. 219.

3. Ibid., pp. 228 ff.

we shall next direct our attention.

First, to be considered are the divine attributes which are related to the consciousness of sin. Schleiermacher's position is that sin and evil as universal facts of consciousness come within the absolute causality of God. But God cannot be thought of as the author of sin in the same sense in which He is the author of redemption. To the extent that we have no consciousness of grace apart from sin, we must assert that he is the author of sin. Sin always is subordinate to grace. Because of this subordination of sin, God by His power of redemption enables us to overcome it. It does not mean, however, immediate banishment, but that sin will be banished in time.

Similarly, the attributes of holiness and righteousness are derived from God as divine causality. God's holiness is reflected in the activity of the conscience. God is righteous. It is righteousness that connects sin with evil. God, finally, is love. It is the means by which redemption is accomplished. The attribute of love is the divine essence.

V. CHRISTOLOGY

The whole doctrine of Christ is presented in that section of the Christian Faith which deals with the Christian consciousness of Grace. The fundamental element in the Christian consciousness of grace, he states, is fellowship with God in Christ. In this two factors are involved—Christ's activity and our receptivity. From the consciousness of Grace also, we can discover the nature of Christ and draw certain conclusions concerning the relation between grace and the state of sin in the human soul, as mediated by Christ. Thus, the doctrine both of the Person of Christ and His work grows out of the doctrine. We can, therefore, take our starting point either from his Person or from His work. He preceeds from the former.

The life of the Church and its activity depends on Jesus Christ. The Church makes Him at once its source and their goal. Therefore, the Church contains the key to the interpretation of His Person. There must have been an energy in Him, which produced such effects within the Church. This energy is the power of God-consciousness which must have existed in Him in a perfect archetypal form and must have determined the activities of His life. Otherwise, he could not have become the redeemer. This power or religious energy must have also found perfect embodiment in the Church. Though the Church is not perfect in itself, it ever looks forward to an ideal that is not itself, but

is furnished by Jesus who was perfect in the purity and consciousness of God. Only on this supposition could Jesus have given to men the experience of redemption. Such a life could only be explained by stating that it was a manifestation of the miraculous. That is to say, "His personal spiritual life sprang by a creative divine act from the universal fountain of spiritual life, so that the idea of man, as the subject of God-consciousness found in him historically an absolute realization."¹ Hence, this makes it impossible that there should be in Him the slightest trace of a sin-consciousness or an inner moral conflict or uncertainty. But at the same time His physical and mental equipment must have been conditioned by the age and the environment. Hence the appearance of Christ in the world was both absolutely miraculous and perfectly natural. Jesus possessed the sameness of nature with all other men but "distinguished from them all by the constant potency of His God-consciousness, which was veritable existence of God in Him."² The sameness of His nature with other men is not destroyed by His sinlessness because sin does not belong to the essence (Wesen) of man. Sin rather is a contradiction of man's God-consciousness. Thus, Jesus Christ, because of his perfect God-consciousness is a worthy object of man's faith. It is this that gives Him special significance and makes Him the revealer of God to man as

1. Cross: p. 203.

2. Christian Faith: p. 385.

well as the Redeemer.

He is different from all other men "in possessing a God-consciousness which constitutes a personal existence of God in Him."¹ Bearing in mind what has been said in regard to His human nature, we may state that He combines both the human and the Divine. Christ is God in man. In the union of the divine and human natures, Schleiermacher states that the divine alone is active and the human alone is receptive. During the union, however, every activity is common to both. Finally, Christ was different from all other men because of His essential sinlessness and His absolute perfection which consisted in the perfect embodiment of a perfect religion. Thus, the Christology of Schleiermacher is based upon the experience of God-Consciousness.

1. Selbie: p. 120.

VII. MAN AND SIN

Schleiermacher thinks that man in so far as he contains within his nature from the first a God-consciousness, is perfect.¹ The God-consciousness in man appears in the feeling of absolute dependence. "The tendency to God-consciousness as an inseparable condition ceases to be such. There is in man an inner impulse to realize and to externalize this consciousness, the results of which are writ large in the history of religions. This means that in primitive man this God-consciousness must have existed to an extent which would make it possible for him to propagate it."² But it may or may not be developed. When developed it reaches its highest manifestation in Jesus Christ.

Sin, accordingly, is the antithesis or incompleteness of this religious self-consciousness, which is never present in perfection in any human being. It is always found in relation to or combination with the sensuous consciousness. Sin is a struggle of the flesh against the spirit! Sin is to be found in all the stages of human development among all peoples and in all ages. The sinful man is one whose religious or God-consciousness is subjected to the flesh. The subordination of the God-consciousness comes from his own act and not from any external source. However, this does not mean that sin annuls the original perfection or

1. Christian Faith: pp. 244 ff.

2. Selbie: p. 144.

God-consciousness in man. For without the consciousness of perfection there could be no sin-consciousness.

Schleiermacher regards man as free to sin and that very fact makes him responsible for the sin he does. But then comes a curious limitation of his freedom. Man, according to him, is not free to overcome sin. When the God-consciousness becomes supreme in his life, it is an act of God. "It is a redemption which comes about by the will of God."¹ The repemtive work proceeds from Jesus Christ. It is due to His work of grace that man is led to God-consciousness. The doctrine of sin, therefore, must always be determined by the doctrine of Grace.

Though we come to a personal consciousness of sin through our own personal acts, the final ground of it is found not in the personal consciousness but in the race.² Accordingly sin is to be considered first, as hereditary, and second as actual.

Hereditary Sin

Hereditary sin is defined as "the sinfulness that is present in an individual prior to any action of his own, and has its ground outside his own being."³ It consists in "a complete incapacity for good which can be removed only by the influence of redemption."⁴ That

1. Ibid., p. 146.

2. Christian Faith: pp. 279 ff.

3. Ibid., p. 282.

4. Ibid., p. 282.

is to say, "it consists in an inability to bring the whole nature under the influence of religious feeling,"¹ the source of which lies outside of one's own activities.

If this be so, can there be personal guilt in relation to that which comes from beyond the individual himself? Not if this original sinfulness is viewed as something existing in itself. That, however, is not the case. The guilt of sin is the individual's because the act of sin is his, but the guilt is not wholly individual's. Since an individual cannot be isolated from the community, the latter has its responsibility also. "The self-consciousness in its full significance is a race-consciousness."² The whole race is a unity. The consciousness of sinfulness is, a common universal consciousness. The individual, therefore, represents the race both in space and time; his act is the act of the race and his guilt is a race guilt. This fact is responsible for the Church doctrine of original sin, he thinks. However, the God-consciousness is never wanting or "wholly lost from humanity" and the effort to realize it never vanishes completely. It is this effort which makes redemption possible and also, makes it a race-redemption. The doctrine of universal sinfulness is accepted, but not that of total depravity.

Schleiermacher refuses to accept the scriptural doctrine that man's sin is due to the act of Adam and that human

1. Selbie: p.

2. Cross: p. 182.

nature was different before the fall of Adam from what it became afterwards.¹ "To suppose anything of the kind would be to destroy the unity of human nature and so the unity of the race and of the race-consciousness. "'Sin in general and especially original sin is the joint act and the joint-guilt of the whole race.'"

Actual Sin

"In all men original sin is always issuing in actual sin."² Schleiermacher regards the fact that hereditary sin is ever breaking forth in actual sin as another expression of Christian consciousness. He goes further to state that we are conscious not merely of our own sin, but of the sin of others. In other words, "both the consciousness and the sinfulness are universal. The active principle in the consciousness is vivid conception of the Redeemer."³ This principle shows how we are implicated in the universal sinfulness, while the Redeemer stands out of any connection with it. "The distinctions between men are to be found according as they partake of the Redeemer's God-consciousness or are destitute of it. In the case of the redeemed the God-consciousness gradually prevails over the sin-consciousness. The results of their activities will be good while with that of the unredeemed the reverse is

1. Christian Faith: pp. 291 ff.

2. Ibid., p. 304.

3. Selbie: p. 151.

the case.

Speaking of the relationship between sin and evil, Schleiermacher states that the former is the cause and the latter is the effect. The human race is the locus of sin and sin is in its totality, the act of the race. Correspondingly, the whole world in relation to men is the locus of evil and evil in its totality constitutes¹ the suffering of the entire race.

1. Christian Faith: pp. 315 ff.

VIII. THE WORK OF CHRIST

It has been rightly pointed out by Principal Selbie that Schleiermacher's doctrine of the redemptive work of Christ is closely related to his theory of Christ's person on the one hand, and to his conception of human nature, on the other.¹ The peculiar worth of his person consists in the absolute power of God-consciousness in Him, as an original possession. However, it possesses that worth for us because this God-consciousness is self communicating, and so passes to us. The impartation of this consciousness is rendered possible by the original perfection of man and of the world. It is the redemptive work of Christ to self-communicate. "The work may be studied objectively from the point of view of the Redeemer's activity or subjectively from the point of view of the receptivity of the redeemed. This will give us on the one hand a doctrine of Redemption and Reconciliation and on the other, a doctrine of Christian communion or the Christian life."² Both of these will be treated briefly.

The Doctrine of Redemption³

According to Schleiermacher, the consciousness of redemption is produced in us by religious fellowship with Christ. The perfect personality of Christ awakens this

1. Cf. Cross: p. 213.

2. Selbie: p. 167-168.

3. Christian Faith: pp. 425 ff.

faith within us as a result of the fellowship. "It constitutes for the believer a state of grace in which all his activities become the activities of Christ in him. It is through His working upon us, as we contemplate the picture of His life presented in the Scriptures, that we are roused to a conscious sense of need and led to accept the gift of God-consciousness which He has to bestow. Just as the personality of the Redeemer Himself is due to the creative act whereby God Himself is present in Him and becomes the source of all His activities, so the impartation to our nature of the activity of the Redeemer renews our being and creates¹ within us a new personality." This position is supported by the following Scripture references: (Gal. 2: 29; Rom. 8:10; John 17: 23; II Cor. 13: 6; Rom. 6: 2,6,11; I Pet. 2: 24; Col. 3: 10; Eph. 4: 22, 24.) This means that, though the new man may still be conscious of imperfection and sin, these no longer pertain to his inner personality, which has become one with Christ; but they pertain to the outer relations of his true nature. This actual liberation from sin is called redemption.

The redemptive work of Christ, however, is not confined to individuals. It is confined to them only as they are related to the whole world order. In short, redemption is world-wide and has human nature as a whole for its object. The field of the new principle of life is humanity and all the energies of human nature become the organs for the

1. Selbie: p. 168.

propagation of the God-consciousness in those who come into spiritual contact with the Church. For, it is in the Church that men have mystical experience with Christ.

The Doctrine of Reconciliation¹

By reconciliation is understood the taking up of the believer into the peculiar condition of blessedness which Christ Himself enjoys. This implies not a change of the will towards God, but rather a change in attitude towards the world and sin. Christ is blessed because he is free from the evils to which flesh is heir. Therefore when we speak of communion with Christ, it implies a new relation to sin and evil. The old man has ceased to be. Pain, sickness, sorrow, death are no longer evils to the believer. Sin and evil no longer limit his religious life, but serve rather for its guidance and progress. Sin is forgiven and punishment is ended. As in redemption, so in reconciliation, this mystical apprehension of Christ and communion with Him give us a greater assurance of blessedness than the magical or empirical view of His redemptive work.

In describing redemption and reconciliation of Christ from the subjective point of view, Schleiermacher "departs from the Church tradition which assigns an objective validity to the death and suffering of Christ as a means of reconciliation between God and man."² Christ's sufferings

1. Christian Faith: pp. 431 ff.

2. Selbie: p. 171.

constitute an element of second rank in the work of our salvation. For, it is not the suffering that is important, but the submission to the suffering in order to attain perfect redemption. Professor Selbie summarizes this idea of Schleiermacher on the sufferings of Christⁱⁿ_^ these words: "Their function is to show His utter devotion to the needs of men and to the work of the Kingdom of God, and to reveal the perfection of His blessedness through His endurance of the extreme consequences of His resistance to evil. In this way also His own fellow-feeling with sinful and suffering mankind is brought out."¹

The Prophetic Activity of Christ

The prophetic work of Christ consists in teaching,² prophesying and working miracles. These three activities also constituted the dignity of the Old Testament prophecy. The source of his teaching was the pure original revelation in him and one that was independent of the Jewish law. "The essential content of it was his self-presentation, the setting forth in discourse of the creative God-consciousness as it stamped itself on his mental faculties so as to bring men into communion with Himself."³

His prophecies had to do with the consummation of the Kingdom of God. He is the fulfillment of prophecy because

1. Selbie: p. 172.

2. Christian Faith: pp. 441-450.

3. Cross: p. 219.

His own person is the revelation of God.

The miracles of Jesus possessed value for those who saw in them an exhibition of His person and character. But the miracles, in themselves, no longer possess validity for us because we are separated from them in time and space. For us today, Christ is the one great miracle.

The Priestly Work of Christ¹

The priestly office of Christ includes His perfect fulfilment of Law or active obedience, His atoning death or passive obedience, and His intercession with the Father for believers or representation of believers before the Father.² There are certain contrasts between this work of Christ and that of the Jewish High Priest. As self-revelational His active obedience belongs to the prophetic office, and as supplying the people's needs, his intercession is a kingly office. His priestly work, however, involves a communion with Him on our part which enables us to share His perfection and imparts to us His holy will in motive if not in actual fact. This oneness with Him is acknowledged by God in his estimate of us and is credited to our faith. In this sense, Christ represents us as the principle of our life.

We come now to the passive obedience of Christ. In His passive obedience Christ suffered for our sins, not

1. Christian Faith: pp. 451-466.

2. Ibid., p. 451.

as punishment, but as coming into contact with human sin and misery. "But for Him nothing, not even death, was evil, and hence there could be no punishment for sin."¹ Likewise, by our union with Him the connection between sin and evil ceases for us, and thus we are redeemed from punishment.² It is by entering into the sufferings of Christ that we attain the conviction of His holiness and blessedness. His suffering therefore is vicarious and His relation to men makes Him representative of the race. The high-priestly worth of his passive obedience consists in the fact that we see God as Christ and Christ as the most immediate sharer in the eternal love which sent and equipped Him.

Thus, Christ is both the end and perfection of all priesthood, because He is a perfect mediator between God and man, and because in Him the significance of the high priestly office is exhausted.

The Kingly Office of Christ

"The kingly office of Christ consists in the fact that everything which the community of believers requires for its well-being continually proceeds from Him."³ It is in Him that the Kingdom of God begins and is maintained. He is the animating principle of that communion, the power that

1. Cross: p. 222.

2. Selbie: p. 176.

3. Christian Faith: p. 466.

draws men into it, the source of all legislation in it, and hence is supreme. All its laws are derived from His personal consciousness and therefore are eternal. Christ is the climax and end of all spiritual kingship.

IX. THE CHRISTIAN LIFE

Schleiermacher declares that "the manner in which fellowship with the perfection and blessedness of the Redeemer expresses itself in the individual soul"¹ is through "regeneration and sanctification."

To begin with the former, Schleiermacher states that regeneration may be regarded in two ways: (1) The fellowship with Christ may be regarded as a man's changed relation to God—the change from the consciousness of guilt to God-consciousness. In this sense, the changed relation is known as justification. (2) The fellowship with Christ also may be regarded as a changed form of life which is commonly known as conversion. It means a definite change of life and a new direction of the will which is henceforth determined by the power of the God-consciousness rather than by the sensuous impulses. Both, however, are involved in regeneration.

"Conversion begins in repentance and issues in faith."² Both are the outcome in the individual of Christ's self-presenting (i.e. prophetic), self-communicating (i. e. kingly) activity as exercised in that communion with which he comes into contact, by word and deed. Repentance is a reaction against the past life as a whole, and not merely against certain individual sinful actions, and a change of mind as to the aim and purpose of life. As subjection

1. Ibid., p. 466.

2. Selbie: p. 194.

to a new set of energies it involves faith. Faith, as a receptive and teleological act, lays hold of the Redeemer as presented in the Christian communion. Though salvation is the work of the Grace of God, this grace has to be received. In the receiving of it, human nature is active. In short, both human nature and divine grace have their share in conversion.

"Justification implies forgiveness of sins and acknowledgement of sonship with God, and it depends on faith in the Redeemer."¹ The divine act of justification is not to be separated from the work of Christ in conversion. Forgiveness of sins by itself is not sufficient as an expression of the new life. It involves also the new relation to God. As forgiveness stands in relation to repentance so does justification to faith. Repentance finds its issue in forgiveness of sins and faith in the consciousness of sonship to God through fellowship with Jesus Christ.² Justification, therefore, takes place at the same time as conversion. Together they constitute the state of the new man.³

Justification, however, should not be regarded as an isolated act or judgment depending on a single event or transaction. For this is to make God's action temporal

1. Cross: p. 496, cf. Christian Faith: p. 496.

2. Cf. Christian Faith: pp. 497-499.

3. Ibid., pp. 497-499.

and dependent in its nature. Furthermore, it would destroy the feeling of absolute dependence. "Justification is the result of God's eternal and universal decree, which includes the sending of Jesus Christ and effects which are to follow from His coming."¹

Turning now to sanctification, Schleiermacher means by it, movement toward holiness and not holiness itself. It is a gradual movement from the pre-regenerate state toward Christ. When we say that one is in a state of sanctification, we mean that state in which he came under the power of prevenient grace. Grace influences men by prompting them to repentance and faith, and to actions which tend to set up the habit of holiness. It is the direction of will away from sin and toward Christ. As previously indicated, this development is gradual because the new life still is the scene of a continual opposition between the God-consciousness and sin-consciousness.

Two other subjects, election and communication, must be considered.

Schleiermacher relates the consciousness of redemption in Christ for the individual with his race consciousness. The work of Christ is potentially a work for the human race. But just as in the case of individual regeneration, the spread of the knowledge of Christ from individual to individual, from individual to multitude, from nation to nations, is gradual. In this work the Church is the chief organ. The consequence of this is seen in the idea of fore-ordination, which means

that through divine grace all mankind are to enter His kingdom as a result of a world plan and the determining grace of God.

From the doctrine of fore-ordination may be deduced also the doctrine of the determining grounds of election. If we regard the career of the individual from the beginning, these determining grounds of election are to be found in the divine good will, but if we regard it from the point of view of the purpose which his election serves, they are to be found in the divine fore-knowledge. Both divine goodwill and divine fore-knowledge are one and the same principle viewed from opposite stand points.

Finally, by the communication of the Holy Spirit, Schleiermacher simply means the bestowal of the Divine Spirit upon the Church by Christ. The Holy Spirit may be described as the common spirit of those who are sanctified, by the possession of which they become a unity.

X. THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH

The consideration of this doctrine will conclude the presentation of Schleiermacher's theology. This subject is considered in the "Speeches"¹ as well as in the Christian Faith.² In the former the main principles of his conception of the Church are set forth, and in the latter, he elaborates the doctrine of the Christian fellowship from the theological point of view.

"The Christian Church takes the shape through the coming together of regenerate individuals to form a system of mutual interaction and co-operation."³ It is their desire to win others and to perfect the work of the Kingdom of God in human society. But because the Church and the end which it contemplates are subject to the conditions of time and place, it is necessary to consider the origin of the Church in relation to the divine world order, on the one hand, and in relation to its unifying principle on the other. The two values which result, election and the communication of the Holy Spirit, have already been discussed in another section.

The permanent features in the life and work of the Church are the Holy Scriptures, the Ministry, the Sacraments, the Office of the Keys and Prayer in the name of Jesus.⁴

1. Oman: pp. 147 ff.

2. Christian Faith: pp. 525 ff.

3. Ibid., p. 532.

4. Ibid., p. 586.

The New Testament Scripture is a work of the Holy Spirit as the common spirit of the Church. "The authority of Holy Scripture cannot be the foundation of faith in Christ."¹ For it is faith in Christ which gives rise to reverence for them. If the converse were true, it would make the Scriptures to rest only on the appeal to reason. The doctrines are found in the Scriptures because they are Christian. It is this that makes the doctrines important for the Church. They express the spirit of Christ. But he advocates free criticism of the Bible.

Schleiermacher makes a distinction between the Old Testament and the New. They are different in this respect: The Old Testament is animated by the spirit of law rather than grace which is the spirit of the New.

He distinguishes within the Christian ministry between an undetermined and occasional ministry and one which is formal and ordered. That is to say, he makes a distinction between the ministry of Christ by lay members of the Church and the regular ministers. Both are necessary, but this public as well as private ministry of the Church must be regulated by the Holy Scriptures.

Baptism is an act of the Church by which it signifies² its will to receive an individual into its communion. The act of baptism has an inner and an outer side. The inner side is the spiritual intention to receive the

1. Ibid., p. 591

2. Ibid., p. 619.

baptized into the communion from which issue the Holy Spirit which effects the new birth. The outer side is the physical act by which the intention is conveyed. It is baptism that gives new birth. But it is not the physical act, but rather the intention or motive of the whole Church that underlies it that gives validity.

Infant baptism is valid only when it is an act of faith and involves a confession of faith. Furthermore it may be justified by the necessities of the Church and the demands of the parents. There is no Scriptural justification, however.

The Lord's Supper is an act whereby communion of life with Christ is preserved. Partaking it will strengthen the spiritual life, for through it His body and blood are administered to the participants.¹ The Lord's Supper is a public worship. But it is to be distinguished from all other forms of public service. In the Supper all members are placed in similar relation to the blessedness in Christ; but in the other forms of public service this is not true. The fellowship with Christ is the important factor here.

Speaking of the Office of the Keys, it is stated that in the Church some kind of law is necessary. Because there are diversified views within the Church it needs to have some means of expressing and enforcing the will of Christ.

Finally, Schleiermacher states that true prayer is an expression of the common spirit of the Church or an activity

1. Christian Faith: p. 638.

of the Holy Spirit growing out of desire—a conscious sense of need. But because human desires are all more or less defective, we should pray in the name of Jesus.

Though there are other factors in his theology which could be discussed profitably, it is necessary to conclude and an attempt will be made to evaluate the theology as a whole.

XI. HIS CONTRIBUTION TO CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY

There is a tendency, today, to disparage the theology of Schleiermacher. While for the most part the criticisms have been constructive, Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, and their followers have come out with a most sweeping condemnation. In spite of criticisms it seems to me that no one can honestly deny the value of his work to modern theology. Therefore, in the light of his theological views herein considered an attempt will be made to evaluate it.

As we undertake the difficult task it is essential to bear in mind, that Schleiermacher was a man of his day. We can only properly understand and appreciate his true worth as we relate him and his works to the literary, philosophical and religious movements of the time which have been sketched earlier in this study. The subjectivism of his work is largely due to the influence of the Romantic movement with which he was closely identified. He was writing to meet the needs of his own day when there was so much confusion in intellectual and theological thinking. Schleiermacher did exactly what the Humanists and Professor Wieman in America and the Barthians in Germany are trying to do to meet the need of today. Just as Barthianism is an extreme reaction against the theological confusion of this day, so was Schleiermacher's theology of subjectivism a reaction against the rationalism of his day. It is, therefore, unfair to criticize his views as if he considered his theology as final. It is only natural then that the defects in his thinking appear in time, but it does not follow that his

subjectivism is all wrong as Brunner would have us believe. These matters will be considered as we proceed.

Schleiermacher made a real contribution to theology for he was the first to apply the method of modern empirical science to the investigation of religious experience. His aim throughout is the description of our religious consciousness and his great concern was to let religion speak for itself. In so doing, he for the first time provided a fully reasoned alternative to rationalism and its naturalistic theology and is rightly called the father of modern scientific theology. He conceived it to be the business of theology to inform men as to the real nature and extent of the knowledge with which religious insight claims to be able to furnish them and as to the exact grounds on which its claims seem actually to rest, and to do this without allowing the results to be influenced by any prior philosophical generalizations. By following this line of approach he made religion independent of reason. He must be vindicated in contending that the roots of religion lie deeper down in the soul than all speculative attempts to explain religion. We need not gather up all the theological crumbs to make a religion out of them. As Rudolph Otto states, Schleiermacher must be given full credit for isolating a very important element in the experience of worship through his philosophy of religion.

But precisely at the point where he makes his most important contribution, perhaps, in giving a place to feeling, he is criticized, and justly.

Otto's criticism that Schleiermacher's definition of religion as a feeling of dependence is inadequate is held by a great many theologians of today. In the first place, Otto makes the criticism that the feeling or emotion which Schleiermacher really has in mind in the phrase 'feeling of dependence' is in its specific quality not a feeling of dependence in the natural sense of the word. For, he says, "As such, other domains of life and other regions of experience than the religious occasion the feeling, as a sense of personal insufficiency and impotence as consciousness of being determined by circumstances and environment."¹

While Otto is right in declaring that the feeling of which the great theologian speaks has an analogy with the states of mind just described, it must be remembered that the latter qualifies this feeling of dependence by the word absolute. He undoubtedly recognized a qualitative difference in the religious feeling of which he spoke from all other feeling of which he spoke from all other feelings and therefore, I disagree with Otto when he states that the mistake Schleiermacher makes is in making the difference one of degree and not of intrinsic quality. Though he did not analyze for us the feeling of which he speaks as later theologians or rather religious psychologists have, no doubt, he had a qualitative difference in mind. Feeling with him is for more than sensation, sentiment, and sentimentality. It is nothing less than that religious consciousness which is at once native to

man and the expression of his highest being. 'Creature-feeling,' or whatever term you choose, was involved.

The other defect which the same critic mentions is, to my mind, more pertinent. "The religious category of Schleiermacher is merely a category of self-valuation in the sense of self-depreciation."¹ Schleiermacher conceives the religious emotion to be a sort of self-consciousness, a feeling concerning one's self in a special determined relation, viz., one's dependence. He thinks that one can come upon the very fact of God as the result of inference; that is, by reasoning to a cause beyond himself to account for our feeling of dependence. This approach to God is entirely subjective and is opposed to psychological facts of the case. Feeling or 'creature-feeling' is an effect and cannot exist without a cause. It is, as Otto reminds us, a first subjective concomitant and effect of another feeling element which casts itself like a shadow, but which in itself has immediate and primary reference to an object outside the self. God is the wholly other who is self-existent, independent of any self-consciousness or feeling.

This brings us face to face with the element of cognition in religion which Schleiermacher ignores. Feeling alone is inadequate. Cognition also has a place and part.² Besides the feeling of sacredness and dependence, "there is in religious experience an awareness of Something or

1. Ibid., p. 10.

2. Buckham: *The Humanity God*, p.6.

Some one beside oneself present in the experience and associated with the emotion."¹ This cognitive factor in religious experience is intuition which is "direct insight or recognition." Cognition gives us conviction.

There is yet another element which enters religious experience. It is faith or volition. We must not only feel and recognize, but believe in the existence of God.

Recognizing all these weaknesses in his view, feeling still is the most outstanding element in any normal religious experience. His contribution in this regard is valuable. But as Galloway declares, the value of feeling in religion is at its highest when it coheres with the practical and intellectual functions, neither dominating the other elements nor being suppressed by them, but playing its own part in sympathy with the other parts of the human system.²

This, however, is not the attitude of Barth and Brunner toward Schleiermacher. They contend that he does not truly represent the faith of the New Testament and the Reformers. Brunner violently attacks Schleiermacher's definition of religion as the feeling of absolute dependence.

Hoyle gives us the main position's of Brunner in his book, "The Teaching of Karl Barth." Hoyle says that Brunner states the thesis of his attack thus: "The connexion of the philosophy of immanence, i.e. mysticism, and Christian

1. Ibid., p. 6.

2. Galloway: The Principles of Religious Development, p. 129.

belief runs out into a colossal self-deception, since thereby there is intruded into the evangelical faith an interpretation of the whole life which stands in sharpest opposition to that faith."¹ Brunner continues to assail his philosophical position in these words: "The kernel of religion according to Schleiermacher, is immediate self-consciousness, experience, feeling, not thought, creative originality. The question, 'What is true?' is only to be answered by the other question, 'What is experienced?' This romantic subjectivism, to which the 'How' is much weightier than the 'What', is what makes the question as to the nature of the religious consciousness the fundamental question of theology; it makes faith out to be 'irrational experience,' revelation into 'the originality of religious genius', and pushes aside the word of faith itself in the bare reflection upon faith."² Brunner tries to show that instead of eschewing philosophy, Schleiermacher incorporated the philosophies of Spinoza, of Fichte and Schelling in his definition of religion and hence it is incompatible with the Christian faith as taught by the reformers. "Brunner's main points are (a) that the universe takes the place of god, though the latter name is used; (b) that God's relation to the world is left indefinitely suspended between identity with the universe and the unity lying behind it; (c) that man's relation to God is described as union, flying together-into-

1. Hoyle: The Teaching of Karl Barth, p. 65.

2. Ibid., p. 66.

one-another, mutual penetration; (d) that there is confusion of thought in the description of feeling, now it is pure positivity, and then it is an activity, although elsewhere it is said to be feeling alone, without knowing or doing; (e) feeling is near akin to the later notion of 'the sub-conscious self', (f) the measure of religion as feeling is simply intensity of experience."¹

Thus, the whole attack of Brunner is directed against the philosophy of immanence. That there are weaknesses in this philosophy as presented by Schleiermacher has been pointed out and Brunner's criticisms are conceded in that respect. But when he seeks to overthrow this entire philosophy because of them it is unjustifiable. Brunner's position that a philosophical theory which recognizes divinity in man is contrary to the Biblical doctrine is untenable, if by divinity we mean the spiritual element in human experience.² To escape the philosophy of immanence, therefore, Barth, Brunner and their followers go to the opposite of God. Furthermore, contrary to the view of Brunner, I believe that there is kinship between faith and mysticism,-- though we must distinguish between the different kinds of mysticism. Revelation and faith have their proper place and find their true meaning only within religious experience. To detach them from it and even oppose them to it is to reduce them to empty abstraction. God whom we can

1. Ibid., p. 68.

2. See art. on Immanence-Transcendence, Journal of Philosophy, April 9, 1931--pp. 204 ff.

know only through revelation or faith leads to supernaturalism from which we have fought through the centuries to break away.

From a lengthy but necessary digression, we return now to the main task. Christianity is a monotheistic faith, belonging to the teleological type of religion, and is essentially distinguished from other such faiths by the fact that in it everything is related to the redemption accomplished by Jesus. The original feature in this definition is the combination of the speculative and the historic. He is insisting that while the essence of Christianity is to be distinguished from all systems about it yet it is impossible to discover the essence of any religion apart from a study of its historic systems. True religion is not something outside of the historic forms.

To formulate such a definition he is forced to make sweeping generalizations for which he is justly criticized. From his speculative principles it is difficult to justify the place which he assigns to Christ. Conversely, his interpretation of Christianity is often unduly affected by his speculative presuppositions. When discussing the relation of Christianity to Judaism, the distinction made is artificial.

However, his distinctive contribution is the emphasis upon the historical character of Christianity and other religions. Though his classification of religions has been too abstract and a priori, his determination to view religion in the concrete as historically conditioned opened the

way for the science of comparative religion. The value of this contribution cannot be lightly ignored. The difficulties to surmount in the study of all great religions are very great. It is only when all faiths are viewed in their historical setting that the true worth of Christianity as the fulfilment of all the faiths will become apparent. Because of age-long prejudice, and Christianity has its share, the religion of Jesus as the light of the world has been obscured.

Another contribution to be found in his definition is the intimate relation which he establishes between Christianity and its founder. By according to Christ the central position in his theology, he gave a new meaning to the Person of Christ. Everything centers around His person and His works. But in making Christianity Christo-centric, the mistake he made is in treating the subject theologically rather than historically. It is Christ, the Redeemer, who is at the heart of his theology. Then, too, we should bear in mind that the religion of Jesus is theocentric and is Christo-centric only in the sense that He is the revealer of God to man.

Finally, in this connection, his emphasis upon the redemptive work of Christ makes clear the mission of Jesus in human history. It cannot be said that this idea is original. but I for one believe that he placed the emphasis where it rightly belongs. It was the purpose of Jesus to redeem the world from sin in every form and to bring it into harmony with the will of God.

The doctrine of God to my mind is the weakest point in his theology. To begin with, in his strong reaction against Deism, he tended to adopt pantheistic forms of expression though he is not a pantheist. He emphasized divine immanence at the expense of his transcendence. Some critics think that this was due to the fact that he was not concerned in proving the objective reality of God, but was deeply interested in asking what God was to the individual. But to me it seems that his definition of religion makes it impossible for him to hold any other view. God is the immanent cause of all things and He governs the universe He has brought into being. The criticism of Dean Knudson referring to Schleiermacher's statement that "all attributes which we ascribe to God are to be taken as denoting not something special to God, but only something special in the manner in which the feeling of absolute dependence is to be related to him"¹ if taken strictly would lead to virtual agnosticism contains a grain of truth. For if the divine attributes are subjective with us and represent no distinctions within God himself, it is evident that we have no knowledge of him.

However, it is to be conceded that God manifests himself in human experience and that through feeling or some other form of psychical activity, man is able to lay hold of the Divine as held by the doctrine of immanence. God is a living God and is active in the world. But this is a partial truth. God is not only immanent, but is also transcendent. To borrow

1. Christian Faith: pp. 194, 221.

Dr. Buckham's phrase God is immanence-transcendence.

The violent reaction of the Barthians to this view has been discussed elsewhere. But the subject cannot be left without adding a criticism to the view that makes God wholly transcendent. God, the Barthians say, is the Unknown God. He is the Absolute. "As such he gives life and breath and all things to all. His power is neither a force of nature nor a force of soul, nor anything at all of the Higher Powers of which we know or can possibly know, neither the Highest, nor their sum nor their spring, but the crisis of all Powers, the Altogether Other, measured by whom they are something, and nothing, their Prime Mover and Final Term, their source uplifting them all and their purpose grounding them all. Pure and supreme stands God's power, not alongside of or over but the yon-side of all conditioned-conditioning powers: not to be confused with them, not to be ranked with them, only with extremist caution to be compared with them. The Power of God, the Installation of Jesus to be the Christ is in the strictest sense pre-supposition, free from all conceivable content. In the Spirit it comes into being and in the Spirit it wills to be known. It is self-sufficient, absolute, and in itself true. It is the directly new that in man's reflection on God becomes the decisive turning factor."¹

In this passage all modern ideas of immanence are set aside by the emphasis on transcendence. Such a conception

1. Hoyle: pp. 104-105.

is neo-Calvinistic and leads to supernaturalism. For man¹ can know God only as He chooses to reveal Himself.

As pointed out earlier, this criticism of Divine immanence is weak because all religious experiences are spiritual in part. While the criticism that immanence alone is insufficient is conceded, so is the conception of God as wholly transcendent. As long as God can be shown to be immanent and transcendent, why not ascribe to him both?

The real defect of Schleiermacher's doctrine of God as we return to it again, is in its view of God as Person. He not only has no consistent idea of Personality and quite fails to develop this conception. Selbie's criticism that he frames his doctrine on a priori lines and takes but little account of the view of the Person of God set forth in the New Testament and in the teaching of Christ is very much to the point. A God to be worshipped must be a Person---"like a Father, creative and life-giving, transcendent and immanent, of the 'same nature' as his off-spring yet infinitely above them, the Perfect Person, the Great Companion."²

Thus, the only valuable contribution which Schleiermacher's doctrine of God brought about was a reaction against deism and new emphasis upon philosophy of Divine immanence. Though he ignored the moral argument, he gave us the religious argument for the existence of God based on the uniqueness of man's religious nature. He states that man has a faculty for religion

1. Ibid., cf. Chap. XIV for further criticism of Barth's Views.

2. Buckham: The Humanity of God, p. 246.

as original and distinct as is his capacity for art, for morality and for art, for morality and for science, and that this capacity when fully and consistently developed leads to the belief in God. This is a great contribution because before his time, the uniqueness of religion was to some extent lost in the current supernatural and authoritarian conception of revelation and faith. It is true that later writers like Otto had to correct certain fundamental defects in the argument, but still he was the first to make use of it. Otto, too, like Schleiermacher, does not utilize the moral argument for he too holds that religion is distinct from morality.

Schleiermacher's doctrine of sin is an attempt to get away from the Augustinian position which makes the whole race sin in Adam. His emphasis on the social character of sin and evil is a contribution to the development of our modern doctrine. But at the same time, there are great defects which cannot be ignored. One of these is the fact that he does not give the will its due place. Rather, he claims that there is in man a sin-consciousness as well as a God-consciousness and makes God the author of both. With this view, I cannot agree. Volition plays a large part in the sinful conduct of man, and morality determines whether an act is sinful or not. Tennant¹ states that "the tendency of man to indulge his natural animal propensities was not at first evil, because the moral law with its 'Thou shalt

1. Original Sin: Essays for the Times, p. 28.

not', was as yet unknown. It is with difficulty that these natural non-moral tendencies are brought under the dominion of the higher nature, and every failure to bring these under such dominion constitutes a sin. What is natural cannot be called evil, and what is evil cannot be called natural, for the natural is non-moral and only becomes evil when the nature has been superseded by nurture, by recognized sanctions of right and wrong." It is thus, only when we become moral persons that we recognize sin and it is difficult to maintain that sin-consciousness constitutes the original nature of man.

Schleiermacher also does violence to the nature of God when he speaks of Him as the author of sin. How can a thing that is a contradiction of God's will have its cause in God? It is the failure of man to control his sense-consciousness that gives rise to sin. Man is able to control it gradually as his spiritual growth is gradual.

Criticism along these lines could be carried to other parts of Schleiermacher's work, but I think it has been sufficiently indicated in the discussions up to this point that the permanent contributions he has made to Christian theology have been valuable. While the Barthian movement is a healthy reaction to the immanentism of today, particularly among scientific thinkers, yet in itself Barthianism is inadequate. It is ~~■~~ a God who is immanent in this world and at the same time, outside and above this world, that Christ revealed to us---God as the Supreme Personality.

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